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Small victory, systemic problems
AN GIE NGOC TR AN - 30 APR, 2015

Angie Ngoc Tran examines the causes and consequences of a recent strike
of over 90,000 Vietnamese workers for social insurance justice.
The recent seven-day strike from 26 March-1 April of 90,000 Vietnamese
textiles workers in Binh Tan District, Ho Chi Minh City was explicitly
against state policy.
But it was also against management in the Taiwan-listed Pou Yuen
Vietnam Co Ltd, which specialises in making footwear and other materials
for some of the world’s biggest brands.
The root causes of the strike were systemic problems in labormanagement-state relations: an exploited migrant workforce who are
exhausted way before their official retirement age while manufacturing for
the global capitalist system; an underfunded social insurance system
caused by shirking and recalcitrant owners (mostly foreign); and a rule of
law that fails to protect workers’ basic rights.

Workers won a small victory: an official Prime Minister’s announcement
published in newspapers on 2 April 2. The government proposed to the
law-making National Assembly to amend Article 60 of the 2014 Law on
Social Insurance in their upcoming 20 May meeting.
They propose a law that would be “flexible” in providing workers with two
choices: getting lump-sum social insurance payments when they stop
working, or waiting until they reach their respective retirement age (60 for
men and 55 for women) to get their monthly pension after accumulating
20 years of social insurance payments.
Recent labor history helps in understanding Vietnamese labormanagement-state relations. Strikes against state policies have happened
before. The 2005-6 strike wave–thinly veiled in FDI factories–ended up
forcing the state to legislate and FDI factory owners to comply with a 40
per cent minimum-wage increase (over a frozen minimum wage in the
previous seven years). This was followed by the 2007 strike waves which
institutionalised annual cost-of-living increases and rising minimum wages
in domestic sectors (state and private).
Strikes against both foreign and domestic management practices of fleeing
the factories and/or expropriating workers’ contributions to the general
social insurance funds date back to 2010. Worker discontent and strikes on
the loss of their social insurance benefits (including both social insurance
and health care coverage),[1] and the fear of a bankrupt Social Insurance
system as debts continue to mount nationwide, had caught the state
media’s attention and surfaced in public debates in 2014, including in the
Vietnamese Parliament. [2] So this 2015 strike is not a copycat of the Yue
Yuen worker strikes in China as argued by one pundit.[3]
One needs to know the multiple-level of hierarchy in the global supply
chain in order to pin down management responsibility to workers. In this
case, at the top of the power hierarchy are brands like Nike, Adidas,
Converse, Timberland, New Balance, and Ikea.
These companies place an order with the Taiwan-listed Pou Chen Group, a
vendor who then places orders with its subsidiary, the Chinese shoemaker

Yue Yuen Industrial Holdings Ltd. Yue Yuen places orders with Pou Yuen, a
supplier that employs over 90,000 Vietnamese workers who make sports
shoes and apparels for the top buyers. Pou Yuen also has its subsidiaries in
Tien Giang Province (southwest of Binh Tan district), where there were
many unreported strikes also against the proposed new social insurance
law.
Meanwhile, the state has failed to enforce its social insurance laws, unable
to discipline fleeing and shirking owners, and suffering from rising debts.
In all fairness, the proposed new social insurance law could have worked
for workers’ long-term retirement benefits in a system that duly receives
contributions from labor and management. But the reality is lopsided:
workers contribute; management doesn’t, without penalty from the
government. Already stated in the 2014 draft of the social insurance law
revisions, Article 60 rules out workers’ ability to take out one lump-sum
payment when they stop working before reaching their retirement age.
The lack of protest back then was probably due to the vague legal
language and more pressing concerns (such as legal retirement ages). In a
2014 draft, Article 60 does not explicitly stop lump-sum payments, but
implies this inability in a vague statement: “Accumulating the whole period

that workers contribute to the social insurance funds.” This means that the
funds will be available to workers only when they reach their legal
retirement age, not before.
It is preposterous for Pou Chen (the Taiwan-listed vendor) to claim that
“the strike concerned government policy and it had no authority to
intervene beyond facilitating dialogue.”[4] The strike’s cause, while not
explicit, relates to management shirking its social insurance responsibility
to its workers. In this case, capital successfully transfers responsibility to
the state. “Facilitating dialogue” is a lip service that does not get at the
root cause of this systemic problem.
Meanwhile debts are mounting. According to the vice president of the
Vietnamese Social Insurance office, Mr Nguyс╗Еn ─Р├мnh Kh╞░╞бng, as
of 15 April 15, the total debt is 5,500 billion VND [about USD $2.6 billion],
of which 700 billion VND [about USD $333 million] is completely lost due

to fleeing owners (mostly foreign) and factory bankruptcies leaving
thousands of workers stranded with their back pay unpaid.[5]
The total figure for all of 2014 is even more staggering; according to the
Vietnam General Confederation of Labour (VGCL) President, Mr ─Рс║╖ng
Ngс╗Нc T├╣ng, companies still owed over 7,000 billion VND [about USD
$3.3 billion] on their social insurance contributions (for both social and
health benefits): a big loss for workers who diligently paid their share into
this system.[6]
The situation has gotten worse in 2015: in a survey of 1,200 enterprises
nationwide, 100 per cent owed social insurance contributions to the state
funds.[7] But workers have complained that Pou Yuen deducted money
from their salaries for social insurance for three months but failed to pay it
to the state social insurance office: a common violation that led to the
looming insolvency of the social insurance funds.[8]
Pushed by this phenomenal collective action, the joint delegation–
including the Ministry of Labor –Invalids and Social Afairs (MOLISA), VGCL,
the Social Insurance Office, the Government Inspectorate, and the Central
committee of Fatherland Front–proposed to take violating companies to
court for avoiding to pay into the social insurance funds and expropriating
workers’ contributions. This initiative may sound good on paper, but is
incredibly difficult to implement with an ineffective legal system in
Vietnam.
How did this strike happen?
On the morning of 26 March, after listening to the Pou Yuen enterprise
labor unions explain the meaning of the revised social insurance law,
especially Article 60 (which prevents workers taking out a single lump-sum
social insurance payment upon leaving work), workers started to strike. A
group of male workers went around the factory to mobilise other workers
by turning off the electricity so all the machines were shut down and the
shop floor was completely dark. The first 500 workers who struck went
around this huge factory to mobilise thousands of other workers to join
the strike. At this point, Pou Yuen shut down the factory and ordered over

80,000 workers to stop work. So, thousands of workers went outside the
factory gate to participate in the strike, marching peacefully. During the
following days, representatives from Binh Tan labor federation went to talk
to workers, continuing to vouch for the new law. But workers refused to
listen to their explanation.
For five days (26-30 March), thousands of workers took turns marching
peacefully on National Route 1A–a major thoroughfare, formerly known as
the Korean Highway (xa lс╗Щ ─Рс║бi H├аn), built before 1975 by the
South Korean army engineer corps–completely blocking all the traffic near
the freeway entrance. This effective strategy got both national and global
attention. At the beginning of the march, some photos showed workers
carrying banners saying: “Pou Yuen workers disagreed with the new social
insurance law… Pou Yuen workers called for the elimination of the new

social insurance law.”
On the sixth day, I went to the site and no longer saw any banners. But the
show of force was intimidating. Police presence was everywhere and
prominent. I saw all types of police–traffic, special force, secret police,
local militiamen, voluntary youth–blocking the gate and intersection, and
surrounding the workers to reign them in.
A roving company loudspeaker in an open truck was moving in front of the
gate, trying to convince workers to return to work: “Brothers and sisters,

please return to the factory to work. If not, please go home with your
families. Do not block the traffic on National Route 1A.”
According to some newspaper reports, the police did detain some workers,
perhaps those who they thought were leaders of this strike. Still, National
Route 1A was blocked off and traffic had to be detoured to other side
streets.

Workers demonstrated a sophisticated knowledge about the two versions
of the social insurance law (2006 vs 2014). They also knew that even when
the local unions explained the new social insurance law to them in March
2015, the 2006 law had already expired, de facto.
Here is why: Article 55 in the 2006 social insurance law requires a one year
wait before workers can actually receive one lump-sum social insurance
payments. With the 2014 law, effective on 1 January, 2016, even if workers,
in March 2015, wanted to declare their preference for one lump-sum
payment under the old 2006 law, they already missed the boat because the
one-year wait time will take them to March 2016 when the new law would
be already in effect. Strikers effectively galvanised the central level of
VGCL and MOLISA to propose amendments to this 2014 law to provide
options for workers: either receiving a one-time lump-sum amount when
they stop working, or waiting until their retirement age to receive a full
pension.
Empty promises are not enough to workers: they demanded an official
document in response to their demands before they would end their strike.
In one of the meetings with workers, a female worker said to state officials:
“in order for the workers to have peace of mind to return to work, there

must be an official document sent to all workers, clearly stating that
workers can choose either taking out one lump-sum social insurance

payment like before, or saving it as monthly pension when they reach their
retirement age.”[9]
This collective message was supported by the VGCL and heeded by the
Vice Minister of MOLISA (Mr Do├гn Mс║нu Diс╗Зp) who wrote an urgent
message to the Prime Minister to propose an amendment to Article 60 of
the 2014 social insurance law. This in turn led to the government’s
acquiescence to this request, announced publicly on 2 April, 2015.
What were the mobilising factors? How did the strike spread beyond Pou
Yuen?
Social and cultural factors brought workers together in this collective
action. Native place was one of the mobilising factors: migrants who come
from the same villages and hometowns tend to stay together in rental
units near the factory.[10] Commuting to work is another factor. Housing
in Pou Yuen area cannot accommodate 90,000 workers, so thousands of
Pou Yuen workers must commute daily in hundreds of company busses
between Tien Giang and Binh Tan district (a one-hour ride each way). This
may explain how this strike spread to Tan Huong Industrial Park (in Tien
Giang province).
Moreover, capital is mobile: there are subsidiaries of Pou Yuen, located in
Tan Huong Industrial Park; all belong to the “mother” Pou Chen Group.[11]
But consistent with Barbara Silver’s argument, I also found that where

capital goes, conflict goes.[12] It is possible that Pou Yuen workers spread
the word to workers in Tan Huong Industrial Park. Most workers also have
mobile phones, so communication with each other is easy. There were
unreported strikes outside of Pou Yuen area, such as in Tien Giang and
Long An provinces several days after the Pou Yuen strike.[13] Even after
the Prime Minister’s concession to the Pou Yuen workers’ demands, strikes
in Tien Giang and Long An continued for another week. [14]
These strikers’ perseverance is heart rendering. Observing these workers–
many covered their faces in masks to avoid the heat and pollution,
conveniently hiding their identities–still in action on day six under the
scorching heat of 37 Celsius (almost 100 degree Fahrenheit), I was deeply

moved by their strong resolution and clear sense of solidarity to take care
of each other. Groups of workers distributed ice-water to their fellow
workers, still with a smile on their faces, hope beaming through their eyes,
with the police surrounding them. Many of these strikers commuted from
Tien Giang province. It is clear that the use of mobile phones helped
spread the word.

One of main causes of workers’ demands for a lump-sum amount to make
a living is the exploitation on the assembly-line that squeezes them to the
last drop, way before the official retirement age (55 for women and 60 for
men).
The experience of these workers exposes the consequences of a neoliberal
system: they grow old quickly after only 20 years producing for the global
market. A female worker said:
“Now, the majority of workers were very confused and concerned about
the [impacts] of the new social insurance law, as well as fearing about

being laid off when companies need to shore up their profits ruthlessly. We
go on strike because we don’t think that this policy is appropriate for poor
workers. There are many reasons why we want to retire early: no one
wants to stick around heavy/physically strenuous work for a long time.
After reaching 40 years of age, most workers think about withdrawing

social insurance payments to return to our villages to make a living. If we
have to wait until [the official] retirement age to receive our pension: it is
way too long!”
Most are migrant workers and many want to return to their home villages
at about 40 years of age. A 33-year old female migrant worker from Nghe
An–a north central province–said:
“We passionately want to be able to withdraw one lump-sum as per the

old social insurance law [Article 55 in the 2006 social insurance law]
because the old law is more appropriate for the majority of workers…
When we grow old, we only want to live in our villages, and have not
enough energy and health to travel to Ho Chi Minh City to wait and wait
and wait for our social insurance payments.”
An arduous cycle of work life robs these workers of their health
prematurely. Here is why: wages are not livable, which necessitates
workers to work overtime to make ends meet. Heavy work pressure and its
fast pace exacts a toll on their health: physical exhaustion sets in when
they reach their early 40s.
One 30 year-old female migrant worker said: “With the wage of 3.48
million VND/month [about US$ 167], every month I pay 380,000 VND [11
per cent of her salary] to the social insurance fund. If I work for 10 more
years until I reach 40, I no longer have good health [enough energy] to

work. At that point, I like to take out my social insurance payment in one
lump-sum so I can return to my home village to open a small shop to sell
sundries. But, then, if I have to wait for 15 more years [55 is the official
women’s retirement age] to receive a monthly pension, then what do I do
in this 15-year-period in order to survive?”
I heard and read about many similar laments of workers.
Workers do know that early withdrawal of their social insurance funds
before their real retirement is a short-term benefit. But they have very few
choices for their survival and that of their families. Most want to return to

their hometowns to start their own businesses there. Thus, they need to
take out a lump-sum of social insurance payment, using it to set up shop.
They also need to pay for family illnesses (very expensive due to a broken
public healthcare system in Vietnam), to get an education or vocational
training (not truly supported by an underfunded public educational
system), and to invest in some means of production (such as a buffalo or
farm implement, a tailoring shop, or a small plot of land for fruits and
vegetables). A worker said: “The last time I withdrew my social insurance
payment–about ten million VND [about US$ 500]–to pay for my son’s

hospital bills. Honestly, I regretted having to do that because I like to save
it up for my old age pension, but I had no choice…”
Another reason for early withdrawal is the lack of trust of management.
There is a history of fleeing and recalcitrant owners and of the ineffective
social insurance system that cannot protect them, as explained above.
Workers cannot trust employers to pay into the social insurance system
and question the solvency of the social insurance funds when they reach
their retirement age. Rampant fleeing (mostly foreign) owners since 2010
and rising social insurance debts show that workers’ concerns are
legitimate.
Moreover, the rule of law does not have workers’ interests at heart. Article
60 of the new social insurance law protects the interests of the state and
management, not of workers.
A worker said: “we don’t like this new law because we are worried about

(not having enough) foods and clothes for our family. Our salary is not
enough for our family to live. We often retire early. Most of us are direct
production and manufacturing workers. So when we migrated to the cities,
we all want to save up some money to buy a buffalo, a cow, a piece of
land… That’s why we assume that the lump-sum social insurance payment
is our “savings,” readily available to us when we want to withdraw it.
Therefore, when we heard about the new social insurance law [not
allowing a lump-sum payment], we reacted by striking.”
Other workers lamented: “Very few direct production workers [manual
labor] like us can work until [the official] retirement age. When returning

to our home villages, how can we live while waiting for our monthly
pension?”
These concerns reflect the general feelings of migrant workers toiling on
the factory floor of these suppliers for big corporations of consumer
products such as shoes, clothes, and electronics.
Conclusion
This strike of more than 90,000 workers is different from previous strikes in
that workers were able to sustain it for a week with effective and peaceful
strategy (marching and blocking a major thoroughfare), which effectively
pressured the state to amend its new social insurance policy.
While workers won a small victory, systemic problems remain. Workers are
squeezed out of their youth for consumption in the Global North. They
fought to seize some seed money for their survival, anticipating the
vulnerabilities and uncertainties they will face in their old age. The public
system may not be there to assist them.
Other troubling trends emerge related to young workers migrating to work
in factories in metropolitan areas. First, migrant workers (mostly females)
have become younger in the export processing zones (EPZs), industrial
zones and joint-ventures: between 18 and 30 years of age. Second, this
increase in the supply of young Vietnamese workers means that they leave
school earlier, resulting in very few marketable skills upon their leaving
factory work.[15]
Long-term problems remain. The Vietnamese society ends up paying for
these poor workers’ social insurance and health care when they get to
their retirement age. These workers are bound to face vulnerabilities,
including fatigue from excessive work, poor health, lack of proper
education and marketable skills, and a disconnection from the social
insurance system, not of their own making.

In a sense, the Vietnamese society has been subsidising the
owners/capitalists. The rule of law is in alliance with management’s
interests (with unpunished violations of not fulfilling social insurance
responsibility to their workers) and the state’s interests (due to the
looming insolvency of the social insurance system), at the expense of the
workers in the long term. The promised amendment only happened as a
response to worker solidarity. Workers had pushed the envelope, but their
gain is only short term. It remains to be seen whether the VGCL initiative
to incriminate management violations has any “teeth” to replenish the
badly underfunded social insurance funds to do justice to workers’ hard
work and contributions, for their long term well-being.
There is one bright light in this new labor development. In the literature of
labor movements, I found a new twist in the case of Vietnam: cultural
bonding has engendered a rise of dynamic labor movements in which
workers’ bargaining power and organising skills–based on direct action
such as this one-week strike of more than 90,000 workers–can disrupt the
flow of production, raising the vulnerability of capital.
But as responsible and conscientious consumers outside of Vietnam, how
can we break this vicious cycle of poverty and exploitation, allowing the
workers to move into a decent, sustainable and secure life? The answer
lies in our conscious actions to hold the key stakeholders–in the global
supply chains–responsible to these poor workers.
In particular, we need to demand transparency databases which can report
on specific violating stakeholders who do not comply with basic labor
standards. Shoe brands–such as Adidas, Nike, Converse, Timberland, New
Balance and retail stores (such as Ikea)–who buy products from Pou Yuen
should fulfil their corporate social responsibility to workers. This can be
done by pressuring their vendors (such as the Pou Chen Group) who have
tremendous power over their suppliers (such as Pou Yuen shoe factory in
Binh Tan District and their subsidiaries in Tien Giang Province) to demand
their mandatory contributions to the Vietnamese social insurance funds.
Ultimately, the brands and the vendors can re-allocate a small percentage
of their profit margins to make a big difference in workers’ lives: by raising

their wages to livable levels–above the minimum wage–and reflecting the
high costs of living in the cities. It is within their power to discipline their
suppliers if they fail to contribute their parts to the social insurance funds
for the workers.
The state can do its part by firmly disciplining companies that shirk their
social insurance contributions and expropriate workers’ contributions, and
by truly enforcing their rule of law to prevent fleeing owners. The unions
can strengthen their bargaining and organiding skills by joining forces with
local and global NGOs to truly represent worker rights and interests.
The systematic problems have severe long-term impacts on Vietnamese
society. And the stakes are too high for all involved to keep the status quo.

Angie Ngoc Tran is Professor of Political Economy, at California State
University, Monterey Bay.
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